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EXPLORING THE ROOTS OF OUR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
Samuel Walker* 
THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE. By Lawrence M. Friedman and Robert V. 
Percival Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1982. 
Pp. xiii, 335. $21. 
CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE. By .David Rothman. Boston: Lit-
tle, Brown & Co. 1982. Pp. xxi, 464. $17.50. 
Several years ago Lawrence Friedman admonished his fellow legal his-
torians to leave their traditional realm of appellate court opinions and study 
the much larger, messier and more mundane world of the day-to-day ad-
ministration of justice. The reality of the law for most Americans does not 
consist solely of the fine points of law found in appellate court opinions. In 
the case of the criminal law, for example, the reality of the law is found in 
the actions of police officers on the street, of prosecutors and defense attor-
neys in pretrial proceedings, and only occasionally in actual criminal trials. 
These stages of the criminal process are what Yale Kamisar once called the 
"gatehouses" of American criminal procedure. 1 Although largely hidden 
from public view, they are far more important in terms of the actual impact 
on peoples' lives than the more visible "mansions" represented by the opin-
ions of appellate court judges. 
Professor Friedman has taken his own advice to heart and, in collabora-
tion with Robert V. Percival, one of his students, has produced one of those 
rare books that can be truly characterized as a landmark. The Roots of 
Justice reverberates throughout the field of legal history and the realm of 
contemporary criminal justice studies. The authors give us a better overall 
view (what the social scientists would call a "model") of how the criminal 
justice system works than our criminologists and political scientists have 
been able to fashion. It is ironic that although The Roots of Justice is a 
work of history, it may well have more significance for contemporary social 
science than for the field of history. 
This is not to say that The Roots of Justice is flawless. On several points 
it is less than satisfying, especially where the authors fail to answer ade-
quately the very questions they raise. Indeed, they seem to waffle on the 
most important point. But such failings pale in significance when measured 
against the truly impressive accomplishment they have made. 
Friedman and Percival set out to produce a "snapshot" of the workings 
of one local criminal justice system. They chose Alameda County, Califor-
• Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska at Omaha. 
-Ed. 
1. Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1980), 
946 
March 1983] The Roots of Justice 947 
nia (ofwhich Oakland is the principal city) between 1870 and 1910. It was 
a fortunate choice because an apparently large body of official records has 
survived. The book is rich in detail, not just with respect to general patterns 
but about particular cases, which gives it the feel of specificity. We cannot, 
of course, assume that Alameda County was or is typical of criminal justice 
systems elsewhere in the country, and the authors make the appropriate 
disclaimers. But in other ways the snapshot provided by The Roots of Jus-
tice identifies important general phenomena about the administration of 
justice. Its principal contribution lies in its effort to grasp one entire local 
criminal justice system, from police operations to sentencing and punish-
ment of convicted offenders. 
The Roots of Justice is a commentary on much of the literature in the 
field of criminal justice. In a curious way it establishes an implicit dialogue 
with the second book reviewed here, Conscience and Convenience, by David 
Rothman.2 The dialogue primarily involves methodology. But, as we shall 
see, issues of methodology are crucial for dealing with the substantive ques-
tions of how our criminal justice system works and, in particular, how it 
changes. Both of these books raise provocative points about the prospects 
for the "reform" of criminal justice, points that are extremely relevant to 
current policy debates. 
In its effort to grasp the day-to-day workings of one local criminal jus-
tice system, The Roots of Justice illuminates two major shortcomings of ex-
isting scholarship in the field of criminal justice history. The first is the fact 
that most studies deal with only one institution. Thus, we have studies of 
the police, courts, or correctional institutions in a particular time or place. 
Some take a regional or national perspective, but all are essentially partial 
views. They do not tell us how the apparatus of criminal justice functions 
as a whole and cannot, therefore, begin to address the fundamental ques-
tions of the quality of justice. What we want to know is, to put it crudely, 
"who got what?" If Friedman and Percival do not quite answer this ques-
tion to our satisfaction, they have at least brought us to the point where the 
question can be considered seriously. That alone is an impressive 
achievement. 
The second great shortcoming of criminal justice history has been the 
neglect of the day-to-day administration of justice. Existing studies tend to 
be accounts of the creation of institutions. Rothman's The .Discovery of the 
Asylum3 is one of the better examples of the genre. One finds a common 
dramatic structure in these works. They open with a description of the old 
order; the rising action involves the mobilization of the reform effort; the 
dramatic climax is the creation of the new institution; finally the falling 
action traces the failure of the institution to fulfill the hopes and dreams of 
its creators. 
A number of problems are associated with this approach to history. The 
most serious is that the story is told from the point of view of the reformers. 
The narrative is energized by their critique of the old order, their agenda 
2. In many ways, this book is an improvement over Rothman's earlier prize-winning work 
examining the Jacksonian origins of the asylum in the United States. See D. ROTHMAN, THE 
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971). 
3. Id 
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for reform, their success and subsequent disillusionment. Methodologi-
cally, these histories tend to rely primarily on the writings of the reformers, 
and we are generally asked to accept their view of things at face value. This 
is essentially a form of intellectual history, an account of ideas about crime 
and justice told from the perspective of the reformers. The JJiscovery of the 
Asylum relies heavily on the "pamphlet wars" between the advocates of 
different approaches to prison design. (Thus, the "war" is really a skirmish 
between rival groups of reformers.) The point here is not that The JJiscov-
ery of the Asylum is a bad book; rather, because it is one of the best in the 
field, it illustrates the limitations of the approach it takes. 
There are, of course, different fashions in intellectual history. For de-
cades the dominant school of thought offered a liberal-progressive interpre-
tation of criminal justice history. This view took at face value the 
assumptions of the reformers about such things as the role of police and 
prisons. If the institutions failed, it was because intervening factors, usually 
political interference, preventeci them from fulfilling their intended mission. 
More recently, an anti-progressive school has come to the fore. The JJiscov-
ery of the Asylum was and is the most influential statement of this view.4 
The anti-progressive view simply turns the liberal-progressive view upside 
down. It treats the assumptions of the reformers as inherently suspect and 
regards the institution as doomed from the start. Anthony Platt's influential 
account of the juvenile court, The Child Savers, 5 joins Rothman's book as 
one of the best examples of this approach. 
While the anti-progressive school is appropriately more skeptical of re-
form and reformers than is the liberal-progressive school, it still views 
events through the eyes of the reformers. Rothman's current volume, Con-
science and Convenience, represents a considerable advance, if only because 
it takes into account the views of a wider range of actors in the drama. 
Accordingly, it heightens our appreciation for the complexity of the politics 
of social change. 
The Roots of Justice takes an entirely different approach. Eschewing in-
tellectual history, it seeks to give us an administrative history of how crimi-
nal justice institutions actually functioned. It allows us to begin to grapple 
with the fundamental questions of social history: What role did these insti-
tutions play in the broader context of society? How did the machinery of 
justice affect peoples' lives? What was the role of criminal justice in the 
allocation of power and opportunity in American society? 
Given the task, Friedman and Percival necessarily had to employ a 
quantitative methodology. They needed to identify the general patterns of 
institutional behavior by examining large data sets. The quantitative ap-
proach has emerged as the major alternative to the dominant intellec-
tual/political approach to criminal justice history. Its partisans, led by Eric 
Monkkonen, have been aggressive in asserting its potential. 
A major part of the achievement of The Roots of Justice is its common 
sense application of methodology. Quantitative history has enormous 
4. Id. For an analysis of this book in light of Francis Allen's "rehabilitative ideal," see 
Schneider, The Rise of Prisons and the Origins of the Rehabilitative Ideal, 17 MICH. L. REV, 707 
(1979). 
5. A. PLATI, THE CHILD SAVERS (1969). 
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promise, not the least of which is its potential for exploring basic questions 
that other methodologies cannot begin to examine. But it also entails a 
number of its own problems, not the least of which is determining exactly 
what all those numbers mean. Arrest rates, for example, are not necessarily 
a valid indicator of the level of crime and disorder. The quantitative par-
tisans make a strategic retreat in the face of this criticism and argue that the 
numbers are a valid indicator of bureaucratic activity. True enough, but it 
begs the question of what factors shape changes in bureaucratic behavior. 
Why, for example, do arrest rates go up or down? The numbers themselves 
cannot tell us whether it was because of changes in the level of crime, or 
changes in public attitudes about criminal behavior, or factors inside the 
bureaucratic agency itself. 
Friedman and Percival manifest a refreshing degree of perception in 
responding to these complex questions. Steering a middle course, they 
point out that both traditional and newer quantitative methodologies can 
be "misused or abused" (p. 15). Thus, they use both methods: "Wherever 
possible, we drew samples and counted cases; some times we ran simple 
statistical tests. But at every step of the way we also tried to get behind our 
figures. We read reams and reams of documents, stuck away in drawers in 
the courthouse basement" (p. 15). They supplemented the data sets with 
anecdotal material from particular cases. "Both steps, we felt, were neces-
sary. Without figures, we have only impressions, stories, fleeting moments, 
vague opinions. Numbers alone, on the other hand, are blind and mysteri-
ous: tablets written in an undeciphered script" (p. 15). Amen. The 
message here is one that partisans on all sides of the methodological wars 
should heed. 
So much for methodology. Given these tools, what did Friedman and 
Percival find? Ironically, the most important substantive contribution of 
'I7ze Roots of Justice emerges not from the detailed analysis of the numbers 
but from the general conceptualization of the criminal justice system. The 
result is a "model" of American criminal justice that vastly improves over 
any currently available in the social science literature. 
There is no single criminal justice system, they argue. Instead, there are 
several systems functioning simultaneously. Friedman and Percival posit a 
"wedding cake" model of criminal justice. At the top are a handful of "cel-
ebrated" cases which, for one reason or another, are unique and receive an 
inordinate amount of publicity. Because of the publicity, they shape public 
thinking about criminal justice despite the fact that they are completely un-
representative. In the second layer are the routine felonies, and here we 
find the real business of crime control. Cases here are disposed of in an 
informal and highly routine fashion. As is true today, trials were rare in the 
period studied. Finally, the third layer involves the truly petty cases, the 
minor breaches of the peace and violations of local ordinances. The object 
is not so much punishment of crime as it is the imposition of discipline on 
those unlucky enough to be swept up into the system. 
Each of these layers functioned in a very different fashion. The cele-
brated cases in the top layer involved the full-blown criminal process, in-
cluding that rare event, the jury trial. Many, if not most, of the detailed 
technicalities of criminal procedure were invoked in such cases. The mid-
dle layer involved what we now recognize as a bureaucratized system of 
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justice. Cases were disposed of in the most convenient manner possible -
convenient, that is, from the perspective of the officials maintaining the sys-
tem. The bottom layer hardly resembled a system of 'Justice" at all. Legal 
niceties had little relevance, and cases were processed en masse. 
This wedding cake model is a relevant description of contemporary 
criminal justice. We are familiar with the few celebrated cases, such as the 
recent John W. Hinckley trial, which have a grossly disproportionate effect 
on public awareness. We also recognize the informality with which routine 
felonies are handled. And we know that our municipal courts process cases 
en masse and pay scant attention to the formalities of criminal procedure. 
This wedding cake model is a substantial improvement over the unitary 
models offered by contemporary social scientists that fail to take into ac-
count the very different ways in which different categories of offenses are 
handled. 
The policy implications of this model are substantial. Friedman and 
Percival are telling us that the "roots" of contemporary criminal justice are 
deep indeed. Consider the matter of plea bargaining. Obviously it is not a 
new phenomenon, and those commentators who talk of the "twilight" of 
the adversary system and the "decline" of the jury trial misread our history. 
The idea that we once enjoyed an adversarial system of justice is a senti-
mental fiction. The implications for reform are obvious: We will not read-
ily "abolish" or even substantially restrict plea bargaining for there is no 
golden age of adversarial justice to which we can return. 
The wedding cake model also suggests the hazards of confusing events 
that occur in different layers of the system. The recent uproar following the 
John W. Hinckley verdict is an excellent example of how the results of one 
celebrated case may be used to promote "reforms" (in this case the aboli-
tion or restriction of the insanity defense) in another layer. Friedman and 
Percival's model sensitizes us to the point that the insanity defense, as one 
technicality of criminal procedure, has little practical relevance for the 
enormous volume of business in the second layer of the criminal justice 
wedding cake. Those who think that closing this alleged "loophole" will 
reduce crime or even substantially modify the processing of felonies are 
seriously mistaken. 
Friedman and Percival conclude, with respect to reform, that 
"[s]omehow, reforms rarely 'worked' in the long run" in Alameda County 
(p. 323). The criminal justice system is too complex, too resilient, and it 
"resists deep structural reform" (p. 325). David Rothman has some equally 
penetrating insights into the nature of reform in Conscience and Conven-
ience. But before turning to this book, I must comment on the major failing 
of The Roots ef Justice. 
Friedman and Percival are least successful in answering their own ques-
tions about the role of criminal justice in society. The issue has been posed 
in recent years by radical and Marxist criminal justice scholars: Is the ma-
chinery of justice a tool for maintaining systematic social inequities? Does 
it serve to keep the outcast out and the downtrodden down? In a section on 
"Class Justice and the Functions of Criminal Law" (pp. 315-18), the au-
thors waffle, and their answer is not really satisfying. "These are ques-
March 1983] The Roots of Justice 951 
tions," they write, "that we cannot really answer from our data." While no 
definitive answers are likely, more extended consideration seems in order. 
Conscience and Convenience is a sequel to Rothman's earlier study, cov-
ering the second great period of institution-building in American criminal 
justice. Whereas The Discovery of the Asylum explored the development of 
the prison in the pre-Civil War era, this volume deals with the rapid spread 
of probation, parole, the indeterminate sentence, and the juvenile court in 
the Progressive Era. The ideas underlying these institutions had been circu-
lating for decades, and there had been a few tentative experiments prior to 
1899. In a remarkable burst of institution-building during the next sixteen 
years, these institutions became the established norm in American criminal 
justice. After 1915 only a few states lacked these components of what is 
now the full criminal justice "system." 
The most significant part of Rothman's account is not the story of the 
creation of these institutions but of their subsequent survival in the face of 
widespread public hostility. By the early 1920's parole was in disrepute. A 
large segment of the public accused parole boards of excessive leniency and 
found them guilty of releasing allegedly dangerous felons into society. The 
mood and rhetoric of the period bears a striking resemblance to our situa-
tion today. Other critics were aware that parole boards lacked any real 
scientific basis for their decisions concerning the release of prisoners. Pa-
role boards were only the most convenient whipping boys. To indict pa-
role, after all, was to indict not only the indeterminate sentence but the very 
philosophical underpinnings of our methods of dealing with convicted of-
fenders. Long implicit in criticisms of existing institutions, this philosophi-
cal debate did not really surface until the mid-1970s. 
Rothman points out that parole survived this pervasive disillusionment, 
and the explanation is contained in the title of this book: Parole proved 
administratively convenient for key criminal justice officials. The parole 
bureaucracy had a vested interest in maintaining the institution. Possibly 
even more important were the prison officials who found that parole served 
a number of important administrative needs. Parole was a mechanism both 
for maintaining control over the inmates themselves and for managing the 
size of the prison population. Other officials, police chiefs and judges, while 
unhappy with many features of parole, deferred to the needs of their fellow 
administrators. Reform may well have sprung from the collective con-
science of well-meaning reformers, but the convenience of administrators 
determined both its ultimate form and its ability to survive. 
Conscience and Convenience represents an advance over The Discovery 
of the Asylum because it takes into account a wider range of actors. The 
first volume was too much an exercise in intellectual history, relying pri-
marily on the expressed views of the active reformers. It told us too little 
about the ideas and actions of other key actors, notably the legislators who 
authorized the first prisons and the judges who were given new sentencing 
options. The story is perhaps a bit more complex than The Discovery of the 
Asylum would lead us to believe. Conscience and Convenience, while work-
ing with essentially the same methodology, adds new dimensions to the 
story and enhances our appreciation for the complexity of social change. 
To be sure, it is still a form of intellectual history. It tells us what key 
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officials thought rather than how the institutions actually functioned; never-
theless, it is an improved form of the genre. 
By a different route, Rothman has reached some conclusions about the 
nature of criminal justice reform similar to those of Friedman and Percival. 
The potential for fundamental change in existing institutions is limited in-
deed. Friedman and Percival tell us that it is because of deeply rooted day-
to-day processes. Rothman shows us how those processes are viewed from 
the perspective of the officials who run the institutions. The parallels be-
tween the 1920's, as described by Rothman, and the 1980's are striking. In 
both periods an era of hopeful reform and experimentation gives way to 
one of fear and frustration. Now, as in the 1920's, a conservative crime 
control mood reigns, and we are witnessing a variety of proposals designed 
to get tough with criminals. Both of these books suggest that this conserva-
tive reform effort will not seriously alter the basic processes of American 
criminal justice. But those who oppose the current conservative proposals 
should not take any comfort in this, for the sword cuts both ways. Those 
who have a different view of the problems of our criminal justice system are 
no more likely to be able, should the political mood shift, to effect any 
fundamental changes either. 
The message implicit in these two books is depressing indeed. It is all 
the more depressing because the books are so persuasive. These two books 
are the products of mature scholars at the height of their powers. Friedman 
and Rothman have thought deeply about the nature of our criminal justice 
system and have presented us with two extremely important works. We can 
only hope that they will continue their respective lines of inquiry and that 
the junior member of this group, Robert Percival, will pursue the scholarly 
inquiry he has begun. 
